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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We investigate the effectiveness of corporate governance practices in this paper, focusing on the 
corporate governance practices implemented by TSX listed companies in Canada. We analyze 
the determinants of the effectiveness of corporate governance practices and test whether 
corporate governance mechanisms relate to quality of accounting earnings and company 
performance. We obtain mixed results from regression analyses indicating that corporate 
governance mechanisms are not significantly related to earnings quality and the market value of 
the company. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance is a means of limiting managers’ (the agents) ability to profit at the 
expense of shareholders (the principals) (Gupta et al. 2009). From an agency theory perspective, 
separation of ownership from control leads to problems of incomplete or asymmetry information, 
moral hazard, and conflict of interest. Adequate and effective monitoring and control 
mechanisms protect the wealth of the suppliers of capital. 
Over the past two decades, the corporate governance issues have attracted more and more 
attention due to the increase in educated public investors in the equity markets and the unveiling 
of large corporate scandals occurred in the US and Canada. The effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms has been questioned and has led to continuing research evaluations of 
governance effectiveness in today’s business environment (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski 2006; 
Adams et al. 2010).  
In 1995, Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) adopted 14 corporate governance best practices 
guidelines which public traded Canadian companies were recommended to follow. 
Implementation of the guidelines is voluntary. Canadian companies were only required to 
present in their annual report or in their proxy circulars a statement of corporate governance 
practices with a description of their corporate governance system. The TSX guidelines did not 
initially prescribe a standard format for the presentation of the statement of corporate governance 
practices. Managers retained a great discretion to choose the medium, the extent as well as the 
quality of the corporate governance disclosures (Bujaki and McConomy 2002).  
To improve the quality of the information disclosure on corporate governance practices, 
the Ontario Securities Commission adopted the national instrument 58-101 “Disclosure of 
corporate governance practices”, with effective from June 30th 2005. This instrument is intended 
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to standardize the information disclosure provided by TSX-listed companies regarding their 
corporate governance practices. It states that all TSX and TSX Venture firms are required to 
disclose their corporate governance practices in accordance with the instrument. Thus, after 
2005, the corporate governance disclosures became mandatory. 
The purpose of this paper is to research the corporate governance practices of TSX listed 
companies prior to the adoption of the national instrument 58-101 in June 2005, when the 
Canadian firms were not required to adopt or disclose the TSX governance guidelines. Prior to 
2005, voluntary adoption and disclosure should vary across firms as both adoption and disclosure 
of corporate governance were left to individual companies’ management. Therefore, the period 
allows us to better examine governance practices in relation to the management behaviour of 
individual companies when they still reserved certain degree of autonomy to determine their 
desired level of corporate governance practices. The variation in corporate governance practices 
among firms also facilitates our study, helping us to find out the influencing factors of voluntary 
corporate governance practices and helping to determine whether voluntary corporate 
governance practices enhance quality of accounting earnings or firm performances.  
Previous researches on the relationship between corporate governance and firm value in 
Canadian companies have generated mixed results (i.e. Gordon et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2005; 
Gupta et al. 2009). Therefore, instead of posting directional hypotheses, we state research 
questions in our paper. Most of prior literature samples relatively large Canadian firms with 
governance data available from the investor service of the Global and Mail, which annually 
publishes governance ranking for about 300 companies contained in the Canadian S&P/TSX 
Index. Some studies, such as Gordon et al. (2011), focus on smaller companies traded on TSX-
Venture in 2004. 
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The major contribution of our study is the data we used. In this paper, we utilize 
governance data for all 880 TSX listed companies disclosed before 30 June 2005, when 
disclosure according to corporate governance guidelines was still not a compulsory requirement. 
The comprehensive sample we investigate consists of all TSX firms that none of previous 
literatures have fully covered. This provides us a chance to study governance characteristics of a 
wide range of Canadian companies including many small and medium sized businesses, as well 
as large enterprises.  
We follow the methodology of Gordon et al. (2011) to address the research questions, to 
process data, and to select regression variables. We compare our TSX data with data collected 
for TSX Venture companies within the same period and analyze the determinants of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. We also intend to test the relationships between corporate 
governance practices and the integrity of financial reporting, as well as the corporate value. The 
tests are done along three dimensions. 
First, we run regression to determine the relationship between corporate governance 
practice and several selected corporate, financial and industrial characteristics. We find that 
larger board size and larger firm size are associated with more effective corporate governance. 
We also note that companies in Bio Tech industry tend to do better in terms of corporate 
governance as compared to those in mining industry. Most of our findings are consistent with 
prior literature (Gordon et al. 2011). 
Second, we focus on another important question: do stronger governance mechanisms 
provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process? To answer this question, we test 
whether firms’ quality of accounting earnings is enhanced by better governance practices. We 
derive accrual quality (AQ) from accounting data as a measure of earnings quality, and then 
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estimate regression of AQ on corporate governance and a few other variables. However, 
different from prior literature (Gordon et al. 2011; Niu 2006), the regression results do not 
confirm strong relationship between corporate governance variables and the financial reporting 
qualities.  
Last, we consider whether effective governance practice improve corporate performance 
and enhance corporate market value. We calculate Tobin’s Q as a representative of companies’ 
value and find that Tobin’s Q is not significantly related to governance practices. This result 
stands in the contrast to the prior literature (Gordon et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2005) 
Rather than concluding that good governance does not matter in Canadian capital 
markets, we believe additional research is needed to explore how to measure governance 
practices, earnings quality, and firm value in a better way. In our research, we use AQ and 
Tobin’s Q as proxies for earnings quality and firm performance respectively, according to the 
availability of data and for easy calculation. It is possible that they are not the most suitable 
measurements. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section is literature and research 
questions. Then we focus on data and methodology in the third section, explaining our numerical 
methods in detail. Section 4 presents the results of our regression analysis, and we draw 
conclusions of the paper in the final section. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The Canadian approach to corporate governance is influenced by the unique characteristics of its 
market (Niu 2006). First, unlike in the U.S., the security laws are enforced by a central securities 
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commission; in Canada, the securities commissions are decentralized to the provinces and 
territories. Second, the Canadian market comprises of large number of small-cap public 
companies with limited abilities to attract competent independent directors. Third, Canadian 
companies are more likely to have one controlling shareholder which is different from companies 
in the U.S. and this raises the issue of board independence. Moreover, Canada uses a flexible 
method to address matters of corporate governance. Until recently, corporate governance 
practices disclosures were voluntary. 
Our paper is mainly motivated by a prior literature released by Gordon et al. (2011). They 
analyze corporate governance in Canadian small businesses, which have generally escaped 
analysis in the corporate governance literature. Gordon et al. (2011) study previous literatures 
examining corporate governance in small businesses from other counties (e.g. Eisenberg et 
al.1998; Parsa et al. 2007; Switzer 2007; Malin and Ow-Yong 2009). The studies provide 
background of analysis in terms of voluntary corporate governance compliance and disclosure by 
small and medium sized companies. They also suggest the firm characteristics that influence 
voluntary disclosures, such as size of the company, board size, profitability, and competition for 
scarce capital. Based on these findings, Gordon et al. (2011) analyze the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure of small firms listed on TSX Venture Exchange. They study 
governance data for all companies traded on the TSX Venture before 2005 because prior to that 
date the governance disclosure was voluntary. They employ measures of the possible influential 
factors and analyze the determinants of voluntary governance practices. They further examine 
the relationship between voluntary governance practices and the quality of reported accounting 
earnings (as measured by accrual quality), and whether the determinants of voluntary disclosures 
of governance practices enhance firm performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q). 
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Gordon et al. (2011) find that more effective corporate governance practices are related to 
firm characteristics including the size of their boards, the ownership structure of the company 
(whether there are large blocks of shareholdings and who holds these blocks), leverage, market 
value equity, and the nature of the auditor. They also find that firms in the biotech industry have 
more effective corporate governance practices, both in terms of board composition and 
governance disclosure. They provide evidence that earnings quality is positively related to 
corporate governance and that effective corporate governance practices positively affect the 
value of companies’ value. 
Following the methodology deployed by Gordon et al. (2011), we extend the tests to all 
companies listed on TSX. We intend to find out whether their findings fit for all the TSX listed 
companies, which have not been tested by previous studies. We focus on governance data in year 
2004 and 2005 before disclosure was mandatorily required, and conduct analysis on the 
determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The analysis employs the same firm 
characteristics used by Gordon et al. (2011).  
We then study the implications of effective corporate governance practices on earnings 
quality and firm value in terms of voluntary governance practices for all TSX companies. Our 
study is also enlightened by several other previous literatures, although most of them only focus 
on corporate of large Canadian firms reported by the Global and Mail rankings. These are 
discussed in paragraphs below. 
Motivation to analyze the relationship between corporate governance and the accrual 
(earnings) quality also come from a few other studies. The evidence to date suggests that 
stronger governance mechanisms reduce opportunistic management behavior, thus improving the 
quality and reliability of financial reporting (e.g. Morck et al. 1988; Gompers et al. 2003). Niu 
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(2006) examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of 
accounting earnings. She looks at corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality for 
large Canadian firms. Her tests demonstrate that overall governance quality is negatively related 
to the level of abnormal accruals and positively influences the return-earnings association. In 
addition, the magnitude of abnormal accruals is negatively associated with the level of 
independence of board composition, the extent of alignment of management compensation with 
interests of shareholders, and the strength of shareholder rights. The results from the returns and 
earnings analysis are consistent with these findings. Following her motivation, we compute 
accrual quality (AQ) as the measure of earnings quality, and explore the relationship between 
quality of earnings and corporate governance. 
Past literature which studies the association between the attributes of governance 
mechanisms and firm performance also supports our analysis. Gupta et al. (2009) investigate 
governance ranking for more than 200 companies represented on the TSX/S&P index to explore 
whether there is an association between the composite or sub-category corporate governance 
scores and various measures of firm value. Overall, they do not find an association between the 
composite or sub-category corporate governance scores and the various measures of firm 
performance. Klein et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between firm value, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q, and newly released indices of effective corporate governance for a sample of 263 
Canadian firms. The results indicate that corporate governance does matter in Canada. However, 
not all elements of the measured governance are important and the effects of governance do 
differ by ownership category. For the entire sample of the firms, they find no evidence that a 
total governance index affects firm performance. This is mainly because they find no evidence 
that board independence, the most heavily-weighted sub-index, has any positive effect on firm 
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performance. Indeed, for family-owned firms, they find that the effect is negative. In general, 
sub-indices measuring effective compensation, disclosure and shareholder rights practices 
enhance performance and this is true for most ownership. We follow Klein et al.’s (2005) study 
and use Tobin’s Q as a proxy of firm performance to evaluate whether more effective corporate 
governance increases firm’s value in the equity market.  
We elaborate the data processing and the numerical methods we use to solve our research 
questions in detail in the next section.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We follow the methodology of Gordon et al. (2011) to process the collected data, define the 
variables used in the regression analysis, and design the regression tests.  
The raw governance data of all 880 companies listed on TSX are collected from the 
companies’ proxy statements issued in year 2004 and 2005, the last period during which the 
disclosure of corporate governance remained voluntary. These data cover all aspects of 14 
relevant TSX guidelines (described in the Appendix). In addition to these governance variables, 
descriptive variables, including company name, industry classification and market capitalization, 
are also compiled.  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics used in the analysis. Panel A shows the 
corporate governance scores, other board characteristics, and company industrial classifications 
for all 880 companies. In order to run meaningful regression analysis, we require that companies 
have certain financial variables (e.g. assets, equity, revenue, net income, and cash flow). This 
requirement reduces the number of companies from 880 to 672. Variables derived from firm’s 
accounting data are reported in Panel B. We also need to deploy market based information of 
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these public traded companies to compute variables such as market value of equity and leverage 
(shown in Panel C). Number of companies with available market price is further decreased to 
335. Data are processed through numerical methods such as log transformation and winsorizing 
when necessary to reduce the effect of possible outliers.  
Our tests employ regression analysis to analyze the determinants of the corporate 
governance scores and to determine the extent to which effective corporate governance affects 
earnings quality and firm’s market value. Table 2 presents the corresponding correlation matrix 
of all the variables. In general significant correlations exist among our chosen variables. Given 
these correlations, all variables are used in one or more of our regressions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table summaries descriptive statistics of the variables used in subsequent regression 
analysis. 
 
Panel A: Corporate governance scores, board characteristics, and industrial classifications 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum N 
CG Score 12.395  3.892 13.000  0.000  18.000            880  
Composition 7.602  2.814 8.000  0.000  12.000            880  
Disclosure 4.793  1.824 5.000  0.000  8.000            880  
Board Size 7.450  2.620 7.000  3.000  21.000            880  
Block 1.032  0.951 1.000  0.000  5.000            880  
Mining 0.227  0.419 0.000  0.000  1.000            880  
Bio Tech 0.176  0.381 0.000  0.000  1.000            880  
Industrial 0.080  0.271 0.000  0.000  1.000            880  
 
Data reported for all 880 TSX traded companies includes corporate governance scores, board characteristics, and 
industrial classifications. 
The overall CG Score is equal to the sum of scores according to the 14 relevant TSX guidelines (Appendix). 
Composition, a subset of CG Score, is defined as a sum of scores for the following criteria related to board 
composition (coded one if: the majority of the board is independent of management; the audit committee consists 
entirely of independent directors; the compensation committee consists entirely of independent directors; the 
nominating committee consists entirely of independent directors; the board chair is separate from the CEO; the 
board has a lead director; there is a process for assessing the performance of the board, is committees and its 
members; the directors are able to meet independently of management; the board chair is an independent director; 
the company has a nominating committee; the company has a compensation committee; and if the company has a 
corporate governance committee. Disclosure, a subset of CG Score, is defined as the CG Score less the score for 
Composition (i.e. the score related to the firm’s disclosure policy). Block is the number of entities with voting rights 
greater than 10%; Board size represents the number of board directors. 
Mining is coded one if a firm belongs to one of the following industries (as listed on www.sedar.com): gold and 
precious metals, junior natural resource – mining, metals and minerals (integrated mines, metal mines, mining and 
non-based metal mining). Bio Tech is coded one if a firm belongs to one of the following industries: consumer 
products – biotechnology, industrial products (technology hardware and software). Industrial is coded one if a firm 
belongs to the following industries: industrial products (autos and parts, building materials, chemicals and fertilizers, 
fabricating and engineering, transportation equipment), and junior industrial. 
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Table 1 - continued 
 
Panel B: Variables computed using accounting data 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum N 
Debt Issue 0.336  0.473 0.000  0.000  1.000            672  
Log(TA)* 5.142  2.235 4.906  -4.573  12.657            672  
△REV◊   0.078  0.231 0.042  -1.000  1.000            672  
AQ◊ -0.107  0.180 -0.048  -1.000  -0.001            672  
Auditor 0.845  0.362 1.000  0.000  1.000            672  
       
* Variable ($mil) are log transformed for the correlation and regression analysis; ◊ variables are winsorised to be no 
greater than 1 in absolute value. 
 
Variables displayed for 672 TSX traded companies with available financial and accounting data include debt 
issuance, firm size, growth, accrual (earnings) quality, and auditor information.   
Debt Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if the company issued long-term debt in the year of interest. Log(TA) is 
log transformed total assets in million dollars, representing the proxy for firm’s size. ΔREV, defined as a change in 
revenue scaled by average total assets, is the proxy for growth. AQ is proxy for accrual (earnings) quality, defined as 
the negative of the absolute value of difference between total accruals for the year of interest and for the previous 
year (total accruals are computed as net income less cash flow), scaled by total assets. Auditor is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the company was audited by one of the big four auditors.  
 
Panel C: Variables computed using market price data 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum N 
Log(MVE)* 5.606  2.049  5.417  -2.486  10.358            335  
Tobin's Q‡ 2.357  2.555  1.485  0.594  15.186            335  
Leverage‡ 0.966  1.715  0.337  0.001  9.011            335  
       
* Variable ($mil) are log transformed for the correlation and regression analysis; ‡ variables are winsorised at the 
extreme 1 percent; ◊ variables are winsorised to be no greater than 1 in absolute value. 
 
Variables displayed for 335 TSX traded companies with available market price data include market value of equity, 
Tobin’s Q, and leverage.  
Log(MVE) is log transformed market value of equity in million dollars, defined as share price at the fiscal year end 
times the number of shares outstanding. It is another proxy for firm’s size. Tobin’s Q is defined as book value of 
liabilities plus market value of common equity, scaled by the book value of assets. Leverage is represented by the 
book value of debt divided by market value of common equity. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for variables used in subsequent regression analysis 
 (Pearson correlation; n = 335; Numbers in the brackets represent p-values) 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI I CG Score 1.00                                  
II Composition 0.90  1.00                 (0.00)                
III Disclosure 0.75  0.39  1.00                (0.00) (0.00)               
IV Board Size 0.49  0.48  0.30  1.00               (0.00) (0.94) (0.00)              
V Block -0.06  -0.06  -0.03  -0.04  1.00              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
VI AQ 0.08  0.04  0.10  0.14  0.05  1.00             (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
VII Log(TA) 0.41  0.38  0.30  0.69  -0.06  0.34  1.00            (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
VIII Debt Issue 0.22  0.20  0.17  0.37  0.04  0.16  0.37  1.00           (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
IX △REV -0.01  -0.04  0.05  -0.07  0.11  0.09  -0.03  0.11  1.00          (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
X Tobin's Q -0.10  -0.07  -0.11  -0.20  -0.16  -0.11  -0.33  -0.09  -0.01  1.00         (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
XI Leverage 0.08  0.09  0.03  0.28  0.09  0.11  0.42  0.18  -0.01  -0.27  1.00        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
XII Log(MVE) 0.37  0.34  0.27  0.56  -0.19  0.28  0.81  0.27  -0.04  0.10  -0.05  1.00       (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
XIII Auditor 0.22  0.22  0.14  0.21  0.01  -0.04  0.28  0.16  0.02  -0.02  0.09  0.23  1.00      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
XIV Mining -0.31  -0.30  -0.20  -0.27  -0.22  -0.04  -0.29  -0.22  -0.07  0.20  -0.27  -0.10  -0.24  1.00     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
XV Bio Tech 0.10  0.13  0.02  -0.10  -0.04  -0.15  -0.21  -0.13  -0.14  0.09  -0.12  -0.13  0.11  -0.25  1.00    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)   
XVI Industrial 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.07  -0.04  0.11  0.10  -0.12  0.02  -0.14  -0.06  -0.17  -0.13  1.00  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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3.1. Variables from proxy statements 
In Canada, the most utilized comprehensive corporate governance index ranking comes from the 
Report on Business section (ROB) of the Globe and Mail newspaper. The Globe and Mail 
rankings measure wide range of governance indicators which include board composition, 
shareholding and compensation policy, shareholder rights policy, and disclosure policy. One of 
the shortfalls of the Global and Mail rankings is that ROB assigns weights to these indicators on 
rather arbitrary basis. Also, they are only available for a small number of large companies 
contained in the Canadian S&P/TSX Index. Therefore, the Globe and Mail rankings are not used 
in our study because we focus on governance data of all companies listed on TSX.   
Based on the previous literatures (Gordon et al. 2011; Bujaki and McConomy 2002), we 
construct a scoring system to measure the extent of adoption of the 14 TSX corporate 
governance guidelines based on 22 key dimensions of the guidelines, using data collected for the 
880 TSX listed companies. Each of the dimensions is coded as 1 if the company disclosed 
having implemented the guideline, and 0 otherwise. The overall corporate governance score (CG 
Score) is equal to the sum of scores across all 14 relevant TSX guidelines. Unlike the Global and 
Mail rankings, our method avoids bias that may arise from arbitrarily assigned variable 
weightings.  
Following previous studies that rely on the Globe and Mail rankings (e.g. Klein et al. 
2005), we further divide the CG Score into two sub-indices. Composition, the first sub-index, is 
defined as a sum of scores across 12 elements related to board composition. These elements are: 
the majority of the board is independent of management; the audit committee consists entirely of 
independent directors; the compensation committee consists entirely of independent directors; 
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the nominating committee consists entirely of independent directors; the board chair is separate 
from the CEO; the board has a lead director; there is a process for assessing the performance of 
the board, its committees and members; the directors are able to meet independently of 
management; the board chair is an independent director; the company has a nominating 
committee; the company has a compensation committee; and if the company has a corporate 
governance committee. For each element coded as 1, these are summed to determine the 
Composition score.  
Disclosure, the second sub-index, is defined as the CG Score less the score for 
Composition (i.e. the score related to the firm’s disclosure of its effective governance policies). 
We also utilize additional governance data, such as Block and Board Size which may impact on 
the governance scores. Block refers to number of entities holding more than 10% of the voting 
rights. Board Size refers to the number of board directors. 
From Table 1, we note that the 880 TSX listed companies have a mean CG Score of 12.4 
with 7.6 contributed by Composition and 4.8 by Disclosure components (the maximum values 
for CG Score, Composition, and Disclosure are 22, 12, and 10 respectively). The average Board 
Size is 7.5 directors. The number of large blocks (10% or greater) of shares held by investors 
ranges from 0 to 5 with an average of 1.  
Table 2 shows that the total CG Scores, Composition, and Disclosure are all positively 
correlated to the firm size, which is measured by logarithm of market value of equity in million 
dollars (Log(MVE)) and logarithm of book value of total assets in million dollars (Log(TA)). We 
note that larger companies on average tend to have higher corporate governance scores than 
smaller companies. This is also true for Board Size because larger companies are have more 
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resources and needs to employ larger boards. However, Block is found to be negatively 
correlated to firm size.  
3.2. Variables from financial statements and stock prices 
To analyze the determinants of the effectiveness in implementing corporate governance 
standards and to assess its impact on financial performance and market prices, accounting and 
financial data are collected from companies’ financial statements published on SEDAR. The 
financial statements of these companies are available for the financial year for which the 
corporate governance disclosure was made (denoted as year 0), and the subsequent financial year 
(denoted as year t+1). Market-based data (e.g., share prices) at the respective financial year ends 
are extracted from Yahoo finance (http://ca.finance.yahoo.com). For the total of 880 companies, 
we are able to gather the financial statement data of 672 companies and market price data of 335 
companies.  
Growing firms, which mainly depend on external finance such as debt, are more likely to 
comply with strict governance standards. This is because creditors need to be assured that their 
interests are protected and therefore may require more stringent corporate governance practice. 
To control for the firm’s financing needs, we include Debt Issue as a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if the company issued long-term debt in year t+1, and Leverage defined as book 
value of debt divided by market value of common equity. Our data reported in Table 1 show that 
these companies on average have moderate leverage level (0.966); and 36% of the companies 
issued debt in year t+1. 
To address the financial characteristics of the firms, we also include average sales growth 
(ΔREV, defined as a change in revenue scaled by average total assets) and firm size, measured 
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by logarithm of total assets in million dollars (Log(TA)) and by logarithm of market value of 
equity in million dollars (Log(MVE)). Market value of equity is defined as share price at the 
fiscal year end times the number of shares outstanding. From the financial and market data 
collected, we note that the average market value of the 335 firms is C$1.75 billion and the 
average size of total assets of the 672 companies is approximately C$3.36 billion.  
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Gordon et al. 2011), we measure firm value by 
Tobin’s Q. It is computed as the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of common 
equity, divided by the book value of assets. Tobin’s Q measures the firm’s performance in 
relation to valuation from the market investors’ perspective. As shown in Table 1, the mean of 
Tobin’s Q for our sample is 3.354. Tobin’s Q in excess of one indicates that most of these 
companies are growing firms as the market value reflects some unmeasured growth potential of 
the company.   
We also define Auditor as a dummy variable equal to one if the company was audited by 
one of the big four auditors. The previous findings reveal that companies audited by larger audit 
firms tend to disclose more information (e.g. Wallace et al. 1994). As reported in Table 1, among 
the 672 companies, 85% used one of the big four auditors. 
Finally, we include a set of industry dummies. The companies in the same industry may 
have common features in terms of corporate governance practice.1  Table 1 shows that the largest 
industry grouping is Mining (23%), followed by Bio Tech (18%) and Industrial (9%) firms.  
                                                          
1 We follow industry classification categories provided by the CIBC Centre for Corporate Governance and Risk 
Management in association with the University of Toronto’s Capital Markets Institute. Specifically, Mining is coded 
one if a firm belongs to one of the following industries (as listed on www.sedar.com): gold and precious metals, 
junior natural resource – mining, metals and minerals (integrated mines, metal mines, mining and non-based metal 
mining). BioTech is coded one if a firm belongs to one of the following industries: consumer products – 
biotechnology, industrial products (technology hardware and software). Industrial is coded one if a firm belongs to 
one of the following industries: industrial products (autos and parts, building materials, chemicals and fertilizers, 
fabricating and engineering, transportation equipment), and junior industrial. 
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3.3. Proxies for accrual (earnings) quality 
Since managers may have incentives to manage earnings either upward or downward, we use the 
absolute value of the abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. To the extent that better 
monitoring of the financial reporting process leads to greater financial transparency, firms are 
expected to have a lesser degree of earnings management, and thus fewer abnormal accruals (Niu 
2006). 
We measure accrual quality (AQ) as proxy of earnings quality. It is calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between total accruals for year t+1 and year 0.  Total accruals are 
computed based on the income statement approach (following Hribar and Collins 2002) as net 
income less cash flows from operations. This value of AQ is then scaled by total assets of the 
firm and multiplied by negative one for regression purpose. Therefore, increasing in AQ (i.e. 
closer to zero) represents higher accrual quality. Refer to Table 1, the mean of AQ is -0.107 after 
winsorizing.  
 
 18 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
We draw a comparison between the basic descriptive statistics of the governance data for TSX 
companies and TSX Venture companies (extracted from Gordon et al. 2011) collected within the 
same period. The data are displayed below: 
 Variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
TSX 
companies 
CG Score 12.395  3.892 13.000  0.000  18.000  
Composition 7.602  2.814 8.000  0.000  12.000  
Disclosure 4.793  1.824 5.000  0.000  8.000  
TSX 
Venture 
companies 
CG Score 3.223 3.936 1.000  0.000  19.000  
Composition 1.959  2.075 1.000  0.000  11.000  
Disclosure 1.265  2.487 3.000  0.000  9.000  
 
We note that the average corporate governance score and its Composition and Disclosure 
components of TSX companies are considerably higher than those of TSX Venture companies.  
While the average governance score of TSX companies are about three times higher than those 
of TSX Venture companies, the weights distributed to the two sub-indices are roughly identical. 
Composition contributes 60% of the CG Score and the rest of 40% comes from Disclosure. The 
standard deviations of the two set of data, however, are comparable. This shows that the 
performance of companies listed on TSX Venture Exchange in terms of effective corporate 
governance is more widely dispersed, comparing to the standard achieved by TSX companies.  
These findings are consistent with our expectation to a large extent. These governance 
data are collected for year 2004 and 2005, before the disclosure of corporate governance 
practices became mandatory for all companies. The companies listed on the TSX Venture 
Exchange, which typically are small businesses, are relatively free to choose the desired level of 
governance on voluntary basis. The TSX companies, on the other hand, are required to disclose 
 19 
 
their corporate governance practices according to the 14 best practices on an annual basis. Many 
TSX firms are also cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges and thus are affected by the U.S. 
mandatory governance practices (Anand et al. 2006; Charitou et al. 2007). In addition, larger 
companies have more resources to implement the suggested guidelines. These factors lead to 
higher rankings and lower variance in governance measures across TSX firms when compared to 
TSX Venture companies. It provides an indication of the importance of the compulsory 
disclosure requirements imposed by regulatory bodies in enhancing the standard of corporate 
governance practices. 
We further compare our corporate governance scores with the Global and Mail rankings 
for the same period. The Global and Mail rankings, which originally have a maximum value of 
100, are scaled by our index’s maximum score of 22.  
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
CG Score 12.395  3.892 13.000  0.000  18.000  
Global and Mail ranking  15.301  3.144  15.180    6.160   20.680  
 
We find that the average Global and Mail rankings are higher than our average CG score 
by three points. In particular, the minimum value for the Global and Mail index is reported 6 
points higher than the minimum value of our CG score. In contrast, the variance for Global and 
Mail rankings is slightly smaller than the variance of our index. As the Global and Mail rankings 
only contain the corporate governance data for companies which are components of Canadian 
S&P/TSX Index. These data represent the largest companies listed on TSX. Consistent with our 
early findings, larger companies tend to receive higher score in terms of corporate governance 
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rankings. They face higher requirements and expectations from the market and regulators to 
perform better in corporate governance practices and possess more resource to do so.   
We perform linear regression analysis on determinants of corporate governance, earnings 
quality (represented by AQ), and firm’s value (represented by Tobin’s Q) by using the "least 
squares" method to fit a line through a set of variables. It is to analyze how a single dependent 
variable is affected by the values of one or more independent variables. The coefficient and p-
value of the control variables are summarised in Tables 3, 4 and 5. All variables are defined in 
the preceding tables.  
These regression results provide evidence of what are the significant factors influencing 
corporate governance scores, whether better corporate governance practices result in higher 
earnings quality, and whether more effective corporate governance practices contribute to firm 
value.  
 
4.1. Determinants of corporate governance scores 
Table 3 demonstrates regression results for corporate governance (CG Score) and its components 
on different control variables. Panel A provides results for regression analysis of CG Score and 
its sub-indices, Composition and Disclosure, for 335 companies with available market price data. 
The control variables are Board Size, Block, Debt Issue, Leverage, ΔREV, Log(MVE), Auditor, 
Mining, Bio Tech and Industrial. Panel B displays regression results of CG Score, Composition 
and Disclosure, for 672 companies with available accounting data. Control variables employed 
are similar to those used in Panel A, expect for the removal of Leverage and replacement of 
Log(MVE) by Log(TA) as proxy of firm size. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Corporate Governance 
 
Panel A: The table shows the regression results of CG Score and its components on various 
variables for the sample of 335 TSX traded companies, which have available market price data. 
All variables are defined in the preceding tables. 
 
Variables CG Score Composition Disclosure 
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 7.198  0.000  3.826  0.000  3.372  0.000  
Board Size 0.510  0.000  0.392  0.000  0.119  0.010  
Block -0.210  0.297  -0.159  0.276  -0.051  0.628  
Debt Issue 0.192  0.640  0.056  0.851  0.137  0.527  
Leverage -0.110  0.348  -0.057  0.499  -0.052  0.393  
△REV 0.536  0.566  0.034  0.959  0.502  0.307  
Log (MVE) 0.252  0.029  0.129  0.123  0.123  0.043  
Auditor 0.704  0.195  0.545  0.165  0.158  0.579  
Mining -1.503  0.003  -0.939  0.010  -0.564  0.034  
Bio Tech 1.182  0.031  1.058  0.008  0.124  0.666  
Industrial 0.376  0.581  0.347  0.480  0.028  0.937  
       Adjusted R2 29.02% 
 
28.06% 
 
10.60% 
 
Observations 335  335  335   
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Table 3 - continued 
 
Panel B: The table shows the regression results of CG Score and its components on various 
variables for the sample of 672 TSX traded companies, which have available accounting data 
only. Thus Leverage is excluded and Log(TA) replaces Log(MVE) as one of the control 
variables. All variables are defined in the preceding tables. 
 
Variables CG Score Composition Disclosure 
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 7.846  0.000  4.285  0.000  3.560  0.000  
Board Size 0.357  0.000  0.269  0.000  0.087  0.011  
Block -0.380  0.008  -0.343  0.001  -0.037  0.615  
Debt Issue 0.385  0.190  0.223  0.297  0.162  0.285  
△REV 0.178  0.754  0.195  0.636  -0.018  0.952  
Log (TA) 0.362  0.000  0.221  0.000  0.140  0.002  
Auditor 0.347  0.351  0.436  0.107  -0.090  0.641  
Mining -0.801  0.025  -0.692  0.008  -0.109  0.555  
Bio Tech 1.736  0.000  1.440  0.000  0.296  0.150  
Industrial 0.657  0.162  0.578  0.091  0.079  0.746  
       
Adjusted R2 23.92%  24.33%  7.62%  
Observations 672  672  672  
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From both Panel A and Panel B, we note that corporate governance (CG Score) and its 
sub-indices, Composition and Disclosure, are significantly related to Board Size. Larger board 
size results in better corporate governance practice. This is reasonable because larger boards 
possess more resources and balance of power to implement more effective corporate governance 
mechanisms. Also, companies that are more concerned with corporate governance naturally 
would equip themselves with a larger board. This result is consistent with prior literature (i.e. 
Gordon et al. 2011). 
We also find from Panel B with sample of 335 companies that Block is negatively related 
to CG Score and its Composition components. That is, larger blocks of shares held by investors 
in general lead to lower corporate governance scores. This result is contrary to the findings of 
Gordon et al. (2011) who conclude the positive relationship between corporate governance and 
lager blocks. It also differs from our expectation that a significant number of external 
shareholders will influence the firm to adopt higher governance standards. However, the smaller 
number of Block in our case is possibly interpreted as the existence of a larger number of 
minority public investors who hold less than 10% of the shares, as our study focus on larger 
companies listed on TSX. This may render our result explainable since minority shareholders are 
eager to require better governance practice of the company.  
Firm size, represented by market value of equity (Log(MVE)) in the test of the 335 
samples and by book value of assets (Log(TA) in the test of the 672 samples, also influences 
corporate governance significantly. The larger the firm size, the better the corporate governance 
practice would be. Probably larger companies are more pressurized by public investors and 
regulatory bodies to keep good corporate governance records. An exception is the Composition 
sub-index in the 335-sample setting, where the firm size is found to be statistically insignificant.  
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With respect to industry classifications, CG Scores and its Composition components are 
positively contributed by Bio Tech industry and negatively affected by Mining industry. Bio-
Tech firms are more likely to be growth firms that require more capital injunction than other 
companies. Therefore, they may need to employ better corporate governance practice to satisfy 
the constraints imposed by external investors and creditors. On the other hand, the companies in 
mining industry are more likely to be privately funded, thus are less stringent on this aspect.  For 
the Disclosure component of corporate governance, the only significant influence from industry 
classification is the negative relationship with Mining in the 335-sample setting.  
Unlike the prior literature (i.e. Gordon et al. 2011), Leverage and Auditor are not 
significant influential factors of the governance of TSX companies. Leverage loses its 
significance probably because TSX companies are required to publish their corporate governance 
disclosures annually no matter whether they are involved in debt financing. Also the statistics 
show that 85% of TSX companies are audited by one of the big four auditors, while merely 23% 
of TSX Venture firms engage big four auditors (Gordon et al. 2011). Auditor then turned to 
statistically insignificant in our analysis because most of TSX firms have been audited by one of 
the big four auditors already. 
 
4.2. The relationship between earnings quality and corporate governance 
The regression results for accrual (earnings) quality (AQ) on CG Score and its two sub-indices, 
Composition and Disclosure, are reported in Table 4. These regressions attend to the research 
question of whether effective governance practices reduce opportunistic manager behaviour. 
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Panel A provides the results of analysis for the 335 companies with market price data. 
Other financial control variables include Auditor, Leverage, Log(MVE), Mining, Bio Tech, and 
Industrial. Panel B shows the results of analysis for the 672 companies with accounting data 
only. Therefore, Debt Issue and Log(TA), instead of Leverage and Log(MVE), were used as 
control variables to represent indebtedness and firm size.  
We run two regression tests for the 335 companies and the 672 companies respectively. 
In the first test, we use CG Score as one of the independent variables. In the second test, we 
replace CG Score by its two sub-indices, Composition and Disclosure, as independent variables. 
We present the results of the two regression tests parallel in Panel A and Panel B. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Accrual (Earnings) Quality 
 
Panel A: This table displays regression results of accrual (earnings) quality on CG Score and 
various control variables for the sample of 335 TSX traded companies, which have available 
market price data. All variables are defined in the preceding tables.  
 
Variable AQ AQ 
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -0.151 0.000 -0.155 0.000 
CG Score -0.001 0.669 
  
Composition 
  
-0.003 0.239 
Disclosure 
  
0.003 0.385 
Auditor -0.036 0.052 -0.035 0.056 
Leverage 0.009 0.023 0.009 0.019 
Log(MVE) 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.000 
Mining -0.003 0.875 -0.003 0.875 
Bio Tech -0.022 0.231 -0.019 0.282 
Industrial 0.038 0.097 0.039 0.090 
     Adjusted R2 10.59% 
 
10.72% 
 
Observations 335  335  
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Table 4 - continued 
 
Panel B: This table displays regression results of accrual (earnings) quality on CG Score and 
various control variables for the sample of 672 TSX traded companies, which have available 
accounting data only. Debt Issue and Log(TA), instead of Leverage and Log(MVE), are used as 
control variables to represent indebtedness and firm size. All variables are defined in the 
preceding tables. 
 
Variable AQ AQ 
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept -0.245  0.000  -0.248  0.000  
CG Score -0.002  0.206  
  
Composition 
  
-0.004  0.115  
Disclosure 
  
0.001  0.814  
Auditor -0.014  0.433  -0.013  0.470  
Debt Issue 0.000  0.991  0.000  0.995  
Log (TA) 0.034  0.000  0.034  0.000  
Mining 0.034  0.046  0.034  0.051  
Bio Tech -0.020  0.307  -0.018  0.356  
Industrial 0.015  0.534  0.015  0.509  
     
Adjusted R2 15.38%  15.37%  
Observations 672  672   
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In both cases, we note that the coefficients of CG Score, Composition and Disclosure are 
statistically insignificant in the regression analysis. Contrary to prior literature (Gordon et al. 
2011), we are unable to conclude that effective corporate governance significantly improves the 
earnings quality. The validity of the test results is possibly affected by the low variance of 
corporate governance data for TSX companies. Also we use a simplified method to calculate 
accrual quality. The accuracy of AQ as proxy of quality of accounting earnings is not confirmed. 
Our findings show that the most relevant determinants of accrual (earnings) quality 
appear to be Leverage and Log(MVE) (for 335 companies with market price data). Consistent 
with prior literature (Gordon et al. 2011), it indicates that lager firm size and higher leverage lead 
to higher earnings quality. These results are explainable as the larger companies tend to have 
more comprehensive control measures in place for managing accruals. Companies with higher 
leverage normally are prevented from manipulating earnings via accrual due to close monitoring 
by creditors.  
The analysis for 335 companies points out that companies audited by the big four audit 
firm tend to demonstrate lower earning quality. This does not make sense since big four auditors 
are supposed to improve level of information disclosure and monitoring of corporate governance 
practice. As discussion in section 4.1, this may be attributable to the fact that most of TSX firms 
(85%) uses big four auditors. The low variation in choice of auditors among TSX firms causes 
less meaningful regression results.  
The analysis for 672 companies with accounting data shows that mining firms experience 
significantly higher quality of accruals, as compared to other industries.  
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4.3. The relationship between firm value and corporate governance 
The regression analysis for Tobin’s Q on CG Score and its two sub-indices, Composition and 
Disclosure, are carried out for the 335 companies with market price data. Other control variables 
included Auditor, ΔREV, Leverage, Log(TA), Mining, Bio Tech, and Industrial. The results are 
reported in Table 5. These regressions provide evidence to the research question of whether more 
effective corporate governance practices affect firms’ value.  
Similar to section 4.2, we run two regression tests on Tobin’s Q. We use CG Score as one 
of the independent variables in one test, and replace CG Score by its two sub-indices, 
Composition and Disclosure, as independent variables in the other test. We present the results of 
the two regression tests in the same table. 
Our results do not confirm that corporate governance does matter in Canada. Neither the 
CG Score nor its components are statistically significant. Thus there is little evidence that 
effective corporate governance affects the firm’s value (Tobin’s Q). This finding stands in 
contrast to the results in Gordon et al. (2011).  
It is possible that Tobin’s Q is not the most suitable proxy representing firm’s value. 
Rather than conclude that corporate governance does not affect firm value, we should explore 
further to identify other measurements that may better reflect firm’s performance. 
However, we find that some of the financial control variables are statistically significant 
in the analysis. Firm leverage and firm size are negatively related to firm’s value. It is consistent 
with prior literature (i.e. Gordon et al. 2011). Performance is also negatively related to whether 
the company is an industrial company at 5% significant level. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Tobin’s Q  
 
The table shows regression results of Tobin’s Q on CG Score and other control variables for the 
sample of 335 TSX traded companies, which have available market price data. All variables are 
defined in the preceding tables.  
 
Variable Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 3.416  0.000  3.492  0.000  
CG Score 0.030  0.444  
  
Composition 
  
0.080  0.151  
Disclosure 
  
-0.059  0.465  
Auditor 0.553  0.168  0.537  0.180  
△REV -0.043  0.949  0.012  0.986  
Leverage -0.198  0.022  -0.202  0.020  
Log (TA) -0.325  0.000  -0.326  0.000  
Mining 0.603  0.099  0.606  0.098  
Bio Tech 0.118  0.770  0.077  0.850  
Industrial -0.989  0.045  -1.006  0.041  
     Adjusted R2 13.80% 
 
13.96% 
 
Observations 335 
 
335 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
We focus on governance and financial data for all TSX listed companies collected for the year 
2004 and 2005, before the governance disclosure became mandatory. We analyze factors that 
affect voluntary corporate governance practice and test whether corporate governance is related 
to both corporate management and corporate value.  
First, we run regressions to determine which corporate, financial and industrial 
characteristics are related to corporate governance variables. We find that corporate governance 
score (CG Score) and its sub-indices, Composition and Disclosure, are significantly positive 
related to board size. Also the larger the firm size, the better the corporate governance practice 
would be. More importantly, Bio Tech industry focuses more on corporate governance than the 
mining industry.  
The second question we address is whether effective governance practices reduce 
opportunistic manager behaviour. However, the results from regression are unable to conclude 
that effective corporate governance significantly improves the earnings quality. The most 
relevant determinants of accrual (earnings) quality appear to be leverage and firm size. Our 
results indicate that lager firm size and higher leverage lead to higher earnings quality.  
Finally, we run regressions to determine whether stronger governance mechanisms 
improve corporate performance. We calculate Tobin’s Q as a representative of companies’ value. 
Our results are not able to confirm that corporate governance does matter in Canada. Neither the 
CG Score nor its components are statistically significant. The results reflect that some of the 
financial control variables such as firm leverage and firm size are statistically significant and 
have negatively related to firm’s value.  
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This study has several limitations. First, among all the 880 TSX traded companies, only 
672 companies have available accounting or financial information and 335 companies have 
available market price data. The insufficient sample size may have negative effects on the 
reliability of the regression results. Second, we rely on disclosed proxy data. Proxy disclosures 
may not represent all aspects of corporate governance practices. It is possible that some 
companies may have strong practices in some area, but received lower scores because the details 
are not disclosed in their proxies (Niu 2006). In addition, our analysis is primarily based on a 
single year of disclosures rather than constant years. It may cause data biases not reflecting all 
the reality. Also, our governance data collected for TSX firms are relatively similar across 
different companies, mainly because the TSX listed companies have been required to make 
relevant corporate governance disclosures even before the implementation of compulsory 
disclosure of TSX guidelines in 2005. The low variation in governance practices scores of our 
sample data may prevent us from deriving the meaningful results from the regression analysis.  
Despite our test results, it is premature to announce that good governance does not matter 
in Canadian capital markets. We use AQ and Tobin’s Q as proxies of earnings quality and firm 
performance respectively. However, they may not be the most suitable measurements for the 
purpose of our analysis. We believe additional research is needed to explore better measurements 
of governance practices, earnings quality, and firm value.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TSX Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practice and Scoring for Companies listed on TSX: 
Relevant TSX guideline Scoring*  Max Score 
1. The board of directors of every corporation should 
explicitly assume responsibility for stewardship, 
specifically for 
• the adoption of a strategic planning process; 
• identification of risk and risk management 
systems; 
• succession planning,  
• communications policy; and  
• integrity of internal control and management 
information systems. 
Coded 1 if the disclosures explicitly state that: 
- the Board assumes responsibility for 
stewardship. 
- the Board has established a strategic 
planning process. 
- the Board assumes responsibility for 
identification of risk. 
- the Board has a clear succession policy. 
4 
2. The board of directors should be constituted of a 
majority of individuals who qualify as unrelated 
directors.2 
Coded 1 if disclosures state that: 
- the majority of the Board is independent of 
management. 
- the Board reviews the status of a director 
with respect to significant shareholder. 
2 
3. The circumstances of each individual director 
should be examined in determining their 
relationship. Firms should disclose annually 
whether a majority of directors are unrelated. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate for each 
director who is independent. 
1 
4. Firms should have a committee of directors for 
nominating new directors and assessing directors 
on an ongoing basis; members of this committee 
should be non-management. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that: 
- the company has a Nominating committee. 
- the Nominating committee is comprised 
completely of independent directors. 
2 
5. Firms should implement a process for assessing the 
effectiveness of the board, its committees, and 
individual directors. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that there is a 
process for assessing the performance of the 
Board, its committees and its members. 
1 
6. An orientation and education program should be  
provided to new board members. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that the 
company has a formal orientation program. 
1 
                                                          
2 An unrelated director is a director who is independent of management and is free from any interest and any 
relationship which could materially interfere with the director's ability to act with a view to the best interest of the 
corporation, other than interests and relationships arising from shareholding. If the corporation has a significant 
shareholder, in addition to a majority of unrelated directors, the board should include a number of directors who do 
not have interests in or relationships with either the corporation or the significant shareholder and which fairly 
reflects the investment in the corporation by shareholders other than the significant shareholder. A significant 
shareholder is a shareholder with the ability to exercise a majority of the votes for the election of the board. 
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7. The board should consider its size and the potential 
for reduction.  
N/A 0 
8. The board should review the adequacy and form of 
director’s compensation.  
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that the 
company has a Compensation committee. 
1 
9. Committees of the board of directors should 
generally be composed of outside directors, a 
majority of whom are unrelated directors. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that the all 
committees described are comprised 
completely of independent directors.  
1 
10.  Firms should have a committee with responsibility 
for governance issues. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that the 
company has a corporate governance 
committee. 
1 
11.  The board of directors, together with the CEO, 
should develop position descriptions for the board 
and for the CEO, involving the definition of the 
limits to management's responsibilities. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that  
- the company has a Code of business 
conduct / ethics. 
- the company has a written charter. 
2 
12.  Firms should have structures and procedures so 
that the board can function independently of 
management.3  
Coded 1 if disclosures explicitly state that: 
- the Board Chair is separate from the CEO. 
- the company has a lead director.  
- the Board Chair is an independent director. 
- directors are able to meet independently of 
management. 
4 
13.  The audit committee should: be composed only of 
outside directors; have its roles and responsibilities 
specifically defined; have direct communication 
channels with the internal and external auditors; 
and have oversight responsibility for management 
reporting on internal control.  
Coded 1 if disclosures explicitly indicate that 
the audit committee consists entirely of 
independent directors. 
1 
14.  The board of directors should implement a system 
which enables an individual Director to engage an 
outside adviser at the expense of the corporation in 
appropriate circumstances. 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that there is a 
formal process for allowing directors to engage 
outside advisors at company’s expense. 
1 
*0 = no or not mentioned; 1 = yes (explicitly stated or if the answer yes can be determined from 
the information disclosed). 
                                                          
3 An appropriate structure would be to (i) appoint a chair of the board who is not a member of management with 
responsibility to ensure the board discharges its responsibilities or (ii) adopt alternate means such as assigning this 
responsibility to a committee of the board or to a director, sometimes referred to as the “lead director”. Appropriate 
procedures may involve the board meeting on a regular basis without management present or may involve expressly 
assigning the responsibility for administering the board's relationship to management to a committee of the board. 
